Some argue that there is an organic connection between being religious and being politically conservative. We evaluate an alternative thesis that the relation between religiosity and political conservatism largely results from engagement with political discourse that indicates that these characteristics go together. In a combined sample of national survey respondents from 1996-2008, religiosity was associated with conservative positions on a wide range of attitudes and values among the highly politically engaged, but this association was generally weaker or nonexistent among those less engaged with politics. The specific political characteristics for which this pattern existed varied across ethno-religious groups. These results suggest that whether religiosity translates into political conservatism depends to an important degree on level of engagement with political discourse.
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Historically, ethno-religious group memberships have been associated with political behavior (Guth et al., 2006; Layman, 2001; Smidt et al., 2009; Wald, 2003; Wuthnow, 1988) .
From the onset of the New Deal until the mid-1960s, White Catholics, White Evangelical Protestants, and Black Protestants tended to support the Democratic Party, whereas White Mainline Protestants tended to vote Republican. Ethno-religious group was one of several social cleavages, including social class and region, that mapped onto political preferences. Since the mid-1960s, however, the links between ethno-religious group and political preferences have changed, in many cases weakening (Hunter, 1991; Kohut, Green, Keeter, & Toth, 2000; Layman, 2001; Smidt et al., 2009) . White Catholics and White Mainline Protestants have become more evenly divided in their political allegiances, White Evangelical Protestants have moved to the Republican Party, and Black Protestants have become almost uniformly Democratic.
The association between religiosity and political leanings has followed a different trajectory. The association between religiosity and Republican vote appears to have steeply increased in 1992, and to have remained far above pre-1992 levels ever since (Fiorina et al., 2006, p. 132) . This increase may simply reflect temporal changes in the candidate options presented to citizens rather than temporal changes in the political preferences of religious vs. secular people (Fiorina et al., 2006) . We conducted preliminary analyses that suggest, however, that religiosity has not only become more strongly associated with vote choice, but that it has also become more strongly associated with conservative self-identification. Indeed, religiosity is nowadays associated with a conservative orientation across a range of issues. This relation is strongest among White Evangelical Protestants, but is also generally found among White Mainline Protestants and among White Catholics (Guth et al., 2006; Layman & Green, 2005 ; but see Gallup, 2009 ). Among Black Protestants, in contrast, religiosity tends to relate to liberal preferences on several issues (Layman & Green, 2005) . Not surprisingly, religiosity has a far stronger relation with cultural policy positions, such as abortion, than it has with other policy positions (Guth et al., 2006; Jelen, 2009; Layman & Green, 2005) .
The thesis of this paper is that religiosity goes with conservatism nowadays primarily because contemporary political discourse suggests that these two characteristics go together. This pattern of discourse began in the 1970s when the contemporary religious conservative movement came into being, and has gained prominence during the subsequent decades (Gerring, 1998; Hunter, 1991; Layman, 2001; Wald, 2003) , especially during the early to mid-1990s (Fiorina et al., 2006; Layman, 2001) . But it has not reached all Americans to an equal extent.
Political Engagement and Political Attitudes. Since Converse's (1964) seminal essay, among the most reliable findings in the political attitudes literature has been that "constraint" -the tendency to adopt a consistently liberal or a consistently conservative package of attitudes, and to hold political attitudes that are consistent with one's ideological self-identification -tends to be present only among individuals who are relatively engaged with politics (Baldassari & Gelman, 2008; Jacoby, 1995; Judd & Krosnick, 1989; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991; Stimson, 1975; Zaller, 1992) . More recently, research has suggested that even the relations between "pre-political" characteristics and political attitudes are stronger, or are only present, among the politically engaged (Federico & Goren, 2009; Federico, Hunt, & Ergun, 2009 ).
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The explanation for this type of finding generally favored by political scientists is that those who are engaged with politics are more likely to adopt one of the configurations of attitudes and identities that they view (correctly) as prevalent among political elites (Converse, 1964; Sniderman & Bullock, 2004; Zaller, 1992) . We presently test the hypothesis that political discourse not only influences the alignment of political positions on the right-left dimension, but also the alignment of political positions with the non-political cultural attribute of religiosity. We contend that religiosity does not have strong natural linkages with most conservative preferences;
rather, people derive conservative preferences from their religious commitment mainly because of engagement with political discourse.
The Present Research
We test whether the relation between religiosity and conservatism is stronger among people who are politically engaged than it is among people who are not politically engaged. We do so using a large combined sample of national survey respondents from1996 through 2008.
Political engagement is examined as a moderator of the associations between religiosity and a wide variety of political characteristics, including a range of policy preferences (e.g., social welfare and cultural), core political values (equality and opposition to change), and political identities (partisan and ideological). We predict that political engagement will enhance the connections between religiosity and each one of these political characteristics, given that many political domains are nowadays discussed with reference to the conservative-liberal dimension.
Given the historical political importance of ethno-religious groups, it is important to document what role, if any, ethno-religious group memberships play in the phenomenon under study. It may be the case that the combination of being politically engaged and religious is more common among particular ethno-religious groups, and that ethno-religious group membership Religiosity, Political Engagement, and Political Conservatism 10 therefore accounts for the interactive influence of religiosity and political engagement on conservatism. To test this possibility we include as control variables sets of codes representing the effects of ethno-religious group. It is also possible that political engagement only moderates the association of religiosity and conservatism among some ethno-religious groups but not among others. This may occur because only the politically engaged members of certain ethnoreligious groups translate religiosity into conservative attitudes, or because people with particular combinations of political engagement, religiosity, and political attitudes opt into religious denominations with which they are most comfortable (see Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2009). We therefore test political engagement as a moderator of the religiosity-politics relation within each of the major ethno-religious groups.
Method

Participants
Respondents to the ANES time series surveys from the years 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 served as this study's participants. The numbers of respondents in each year were 1,714 in 1996, 1,807 in 2000, 1,212 in 2004, and 2,323 in 2008 2 . Thus the total sample size is 7,056, although sample sizes vary across analyses. Analyses are weighted using post-stratification weights.
Measures
The items that were selected to measure each of the key variables are listed in the Appendix, along with internal reliability coefficients where relevant. To represent ethnoreligious group, sets of dummy codes were generated for White Evangelical Protestant, White
Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant, White Catholic, White non-traditional Protestant, Jewish, and other religions. The comparison category was individuals with no religious affiliation.
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The remaining key measures consisted of items involving forced-choice responses, or Religiosity, Political Engagement, and Political Conservatism 11 correct vs. incorrect answers. Each composite was computed for a participant if he/she was administered and provided a usable response to at least 50% of the items comprising the composite. All items assessing policy preferences, values, or identities were coded so that higher scores correspond with a "conservative" position. Indicators that were combined into composites were first transformed into a common scale, and all variables used in analyses were coded to range from 0 to 1 in order to facilitate the interpretation of unstandardized regression coefficients. As indicated in the Appendix, certain items were not administered in all of the years, or for all of the respondents within a particular year. In these cases, respondents who were not administered particular items were counted as not having provided usable responses to those items. Finally, items were sometimes administered with slightly different wording or response options either across or within years. Such cases are noted in the footnotes of the Appendix.
The religiosity measure was formed as a composite of religious attendance and rating of how much guidance religion provides in one's life (r = .58, p <.001).
We conceptualize political engagement as overall involvement with political information, as manifested by a) high (vs. low) subjective importance of politics and b) high (vs. low) objective political knowledge (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 1992) . These indicators tend to be correlated, but they are conceptually distinguishable. Consistent with our broad conceptualization of political engagement we used a political engagement composite consisting of both interest and knowledge indicators. However, recognizing that interest and knowledge are conceptually distinguishable manifestations of overall engagement, we also individually tested interest and knowledge as moderators.
Political interest was operationalized as a composite of six items including interest in presidential campaigns, interest in government and public affairs, and frequency of newspaper Besides ethno-religious group, the following demographic characteristics were included in analyses as control variables: sex, age, education (college vs. no college), residence in the south, household income, household union membership, and Hispanic ethnicity. Dummy coded variables representing the effects of year of survey were also included as controls.
Results
Associations of Ethno-Religious Group Memberships and Political Characteristics
We first examined the associations of ethno-religious group memberships and each of the political attitudes, values, and identities. Each of the political characteristics was individually regressed on the dummy coded ethno-religious group variables and the control variables. The results of these analyses are displayed in Table I .
White Evangelical Protestants, White Mainline Protestants, and White Catholics all tended to adopt conservative stances across a range of political characteristics relative to the Religiosity, Political Engagement, and Political Conservatism 13 comparison category of individuals with no religious affiliation (Rows 1, 2, and 4 of Table I ).
Evangelical Protestants did so across all of the political characteristics, White Mainline
Protestants did so across all of the political characteristics except for gun control preference, and White Catholics did so across most of the political characteristics.
Black Protestants tended to adopt liberal stances relative to those with no religious affiliation (Row 3, Table I ), although they held conservative positions relative to this group on cultural issues, opposition to change, and ideological self-label. Also, Black Protestants did not differ from the religiously unaffiliated on environmental, immigration, and defense preferences.
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Another set of analyses (not reported in Table I ) examined differences between the four major ethno-religious groups on the political orientation composite. White Evangelical
Protestants were the most conservative, followed by White Mainline Protestants, White
Catholics, and then Black Protestants (ps < .001 for all comparisons). The religiously unaffiliated were to the left of White Catholics but to the right of Black Protestants.
Associations of Religiosity and Political Characteristics
We next tested whether religiosity significantly predicted political attitudes, values, and identities independently of ethno-religious group memberships 5 . and values the effects were small. In contrast to this pattern, but consistent with prior research (Gallup, 2004) , religiosity was associated with opposition to the death penalty.
The effects of religiosity reported above were not attributable to ethno-religious group differences in religiosity, as dummy coded variables representing the effects of ethno-religious group memberships were controlled for. Thus, religious people did not tend to hold conservative views simply because they tended to have particular religious affiliations. However, the associations of religiosity and political characteristics did vary across ethno-religious groups. As in prior research (e.g., Guth et al., 2006; Layman & Green, 2005 ) the associations were strongest and most consistent among White Evangelical Protestants, followed distantly by White Mainline
Protestants. Among the religiously unaffiliated, religiosity was slightly correlated with conservative political orientation, but this effect became marginally significant with the control variables entered. Among White Catholics, religiosity was uncorrelated with the political orientation composite, and among Black Protestants, religiosity was slightly negatively associated with conservative political orientation 7 . Consistent with the messages that predominate Black religious discourse, religiosity, for example, was associated with liberal social welfare policy views among this group. Also, while one might expect to find an Religiosity, Political Engagement, and Political Conservatism 15 association between religiosity and opposition to the death penalty only among Black Protestants and White Catholics, such an association was in fact observed among all of the groups.
Political Engagement as a Moderator of the Associations of Religiosity and Political
Characteristics
We next proceeded to test our primary hypothesis: that the relations between religiosity and conservative political characteristics would hold to a significantly stronger extent, or exclusively, among those who were relatively engaged with politics.
As displayed in the third row of Table III, As displayed in the bottom two rows of Table III , the relation between religiosity and conservative views tended to exist to a stronger extent, or to only exist, among those relatively Religiosity, Political Engagement, and Political Conservatism 16 high in political engagement. These rows display the simple slopes for the effects of religiosity on the political characteristics for hypothetical individuals +1 and -1 SD from the mean on political engagement. Among people high in political engagement, religiosity was associated with conservative positions on every political characteristic except for immigration and death penalty, and religiosity was associated with a conservative orientation as indicated by the political orientation composite (b = .10, p < .001). Thus, in general, religiosity corresponds with conservatism among the highly politically engaged. In contrast, among people low in political engagement, religiosity was not positively associated with 8 out of the 12 unique political characteristics assessed, and was relatively weakly associated with the political orientation composite (b = .03, p < .001). Religiosity was associated with conservative cultural stances, opposition to change, Republican identification, and conservative identification among these individuals, but to a (in three cases significantly) lesser extent than it was among the politically engaged. Among those low in political engagement, religiosity was relatively strongly associated with opposition to the death penalty, whereas this relation was significantly smaller among those high in political engagement.
In sum, religiosity's relations with most of the political characteristics assessed were moderated by political engagement. 8 Furthermore, religiosity's differential effects as a function of political engagement were not attributable to ethno-religious group differences.
Does Political Engagement Moderate the Religiosity-Politics Associations Across all of the Major Ethno-Religious Groups?
As displayed in the initial set of analyses, ethno-religious group memberships in many cases predicted political characteristics and moderated the relations between religiosity and these political characteristics. Given these initial findings and the historical political importance of Religiosity, Political Engagement, and Political Conservatism 17
ethno-religious groups, we examined whether political engagement moderated the relation between religiosity and conservatism among each of the major ethno-religious groups.
Tables IV through VIII display the moderation findings among each of the four major ethno-religious groups (Tables IV through VII) and among individuals with no religious affiliation (Table VIII) Across the ethno-religious groups, there was variability in the particular political characteristics whose relations with religiosity were moderated by political engagement. Among White Evangelical Protestants the interaction effect was in the predicted direction for all unique political characteristics besides immigration policy preference, but it was only statistically significant for three of these political characteristics (see Table IV ). Among White Mainline
Protestants the interaction effect was in the predicted direction for eight of the twelve unique political characteristics, but the size of these effects were small and none approached statistical significance (see Table V ). In fact, moderation effects in the opposite direction were observed for inequality value (b = -.15, p = .050) and ideological identification (b = -.20, p = .058). Among Black Protestants, the interaction effect was in the predicted direction for all of the unique political characteristics except social welfare, environmental, and immigration preferences, but it was only statistically significant for four of these characteristics (see Table VI ). Among White Catholics, the interaction effect was in the predicted direction for all unique political Religiosity, Political Engagement, and Political Conservatism 18 characteristics besides gun control preference, but this effect only approached or reached statistical significance for four of these characteristics (see Table VII ). Finally, among the religiously unaffiliated, the interaction effect was in the predicted direction for all unique political characteristics besides cultural and environmental preferences, but this effect only approached or reached statistical significance for six of these characteristics (see Table VIII ).
In sum, the relation between religiosity and a general conservative orientation toward politics, as represented by the political orientation composite, was moderated by political engagement for all of the major ethno-religious groups besides White Mainline Protestants. The moderated effects of religiosity on the individual political characteristics among the other major ethno-religious groups (and among the religiously unaffiliated) were generally in the predicted direction but usually not statistically significant.
Discussion
Though the culture wars framework may exaggerate political divisions among ordinary Americans and the degree to which they map onto sociological characteristics (e.g., Fiorina et al., 2006) , there is indeed a religious gap in political attitudes and behavior among contemporary Americans (Guth et al., 2006; Layman, 2001; Layman & Carmines, 1997; Layman & Green, 2005; Olson & Green, 2006) . Those with greater levels of religious commitment are more inclined to hold conservative political positions than are those with lower levels of religious commitment. We tested whether the widely demonstrated relation between religiosity and conservatism is contingent on engagement with political discourse. We examined as outcome variables a wide range of policy preferences, the core values posited to underlie these policy preferences, and the political identities that correlate with these policy preferences.
Across the entire sample, the relation between religiosity and political orientation varied Religiosity, Political Engagement, and Political Conservatism 19 significantly as a function of political engagement. Among those high in political engagement, the more religious were generally more inclined than were the less religious to adopt the issue stances and values nowadays described as conservative, and they were also more likely than the less religious to identify as Republican. Among those low in political engagement, in contrast, there was no relation between religiosity and most of the political characteristics sampled.
Among those low in political engagement the more religious did tend toward conservative cultural stances, opposition to change, Republican self-identification, and conservative selfidentification, which resulted in a small tendency toward overall conservative political orientation. Regarding these political characteristics, it is possible that the cues of religious elites are sufficient to inform religious individuals about the appropriate positions on these dimensions without additional exposure to political discourse (Layman & Green, 2005) . However, engagement with political discourse still does seem to enhance religiosity's relations with cultural policy preferences, opposition to change, and Republican self-identification. Finally, religiosity was associated with opposition to the death penalty, and this relation appeared to be largely counteracted by engagement with political discourse.
It is commonly stated or implied that religiosity and conservative political attitudes are inherently related. For example, in a study demonstrating diverse correlates of ideological selflabel, including aspects of religiosity, Jost et al. (2008) argued that the psychological roots of political ideology help explain an apparent historical consistency in the structure and correlates of right vs. left ideology. The fact that religiosity and conservative political attitudes are generally correlated is suggested to reflect a deep-seated psychological linkage (Jost, 2007; Jost et al., 2008) . Similarly, Alford et al. (2005) argued that the heritability of political attitudes and related characteristics such as religiosity helps explain "the otherwise puzzling consistency in That religiosity was related to cultural policy preferences, opposition to change, Republican identity, and conservative identity among those low in political engagement is consistent with the possibility that certain components of what is nowadays described as conservative ideology may possess some type of organic linkage with religiosity. For example, it is possible that certain underlying dispositions in part drive both religiosity and a tendency to favor cultural traditionalism, oppose change, and view oneself as Republican and conservative (Jost et al., 2003) . Indeed, behavioral genetics studies tend to find notable heritable components to both religiosity and a range of political attitudes (Alford et al., 2005; Eaves, Eysenck, & Martin, 1989) , suggesting that basic predispositions to some extent drive both. However, when considering the full range of preferences and values associated with "conservatism" nowadays, engagement with political communication seems to be the predominant factor that drives the alignment of religiosity and political orientation.
Ethno-religious group memberships have historically mapped onto political cleavages in the USA (Hunter, 1991; Wald, 2003) , and they continue to do so (Guth et al., 2006; Layman, 2001; Layman & Green, 2005 It appears, nonetheless, that the phenomenon presently under study is not driven by differences among ethno-religious groups in the political characteristics examined here. The general moderation finding occurred when controlling for ethno-religious group memberships;
thus it is not the result of certain ethno-religious groups possessing particular combinations of religiosity and political engagement. As for the mechanisms involved in the present phenomenon, we think that it is likely that politically engaged individuals tend to adjust their political attitudes to correspond "appropriately" with their levels of religiosity. Indeed, prior research suggests that Americans sometimes adjust their political positions to correspond with politically relevant identities (Cohen, 2003; Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Gerber & Jackson, 1993; Goren, Federico, & Kittilson, 2009; Layman & Carsey, 2002; Malka & Lelkes, 2010; Rahn, 1993) . However, it is also possible that politically engaged individuals adjust their religiosity levels to correspond with their political orientations. For example, an individual who Religiosity, Political Engagement, and Political Conservatism 22 holds liberal political attitudes and who is exposed to discourse indicating that liberalism goes with secularism may decide that she is not religious as a result. Both of these causal directions are consistent with the more general thesis that political engagement leads people to align their religiosity levels and political orientations.
It is also possible that possessing aligned (vs. misaligned) levels of religiosity and political orientation causes people to become more (vs. less) engaged with politics. For example, a religious conservative may decide based on the discourse to which she is exposed that politics is interesting for her, whereas a religious liberal may decide that it is not. However, our initial findings regarding temporal change in the religiosity-politics link in the early 1990s suggest that changes in context of information can influence the degree to which religiosity and politics are aligned (see Figure 1) . Thus, even if aligned individuals tend to become more engaged with politics, it is reasonable to expect that differences among people in engagement with political information also influences the degree to which religiosity and politics are aligned. We look forward to research testing causal direction using longitudinal and experimental methodology.
It is noteworthy that the relations of religiosity and individual political characteristics were inconsistently moderated by political engagement among members of the individual ethnoreligious groups. Although the association of religiosity with general political orientation was moderated by political engagement among White Evangelical Protestants, Black Protestants, White Catholics, and the religiously unaffiliated, the religiosity X political engagement interaction was often a non-significant predictor of individual political characteristics within each of these groups. However, when combined across the entire sample, the religiosity X political engagement interaction was a significant predictor of most of the individual political characteristics. Moreover, within these particular ethno-religious groups, a strong majority of the Religiosity, Political Engagement, and Political Conservatism 23 moderation findings were in the predicted direction. This pattern suggests that the moderated effects of religiosity on specific political characteristics are generally small (and require a large sample to be detected), but that they add up to a more robust moderated effect of religiosity on overall conservative orientation.
White Mainline Protestants constituted the exception to this pattern. In fact, politically engaged White Mainline Protestants were less likely to translate religiosity into conservative identity and opposition to equality than were their low political engagement counterparts. This may reflect the unique historical emphases of Mainline Protestantism (e.g., Guth et al., 2006), although it is unclear why these historical emphases would not produce this pattern across other political characteristics. Future research is needed to resolve this question.
Conclusion
Since the time of the French Revolution, political discourse across many societies has conveyed that a right-left political dimension is relevant to a range of substantive political and social attitudes. One characteristic that has been stated at various times to 'go with' this ideological dimension is support of, and commitment to, traditional religious institutions. Our evidence suggests that, among contemporary Americans, the link between being a religious person and being a politically conservative person is largely a product of engagement with political discourse. One implication of these findings is that the particular issue stances and values that are nowadays discussed in terms of a right-left political dimension would correlate differently with religiosity within different contexts of information. We hope that the present analyses are supplemented with cross-national, time series, longitudinal, and experimental analyses to enhance understanding of how context of information influences the relation between these two socially significant constructs. 7 Whereas among Black Protestants there was a negative relation between religiosity and the political orientation composite, among Black non-Protestants there was a near-significant positive relation (b = .05, p = .054) between these variables. 8 We conceptualize political engagement as a multifaceted construct involving both subjective interest in and objective knowledge about politics. However, interest in politics is conceptually Religiosity, Political Engagement, and Political Conservatism 36 distinguishable from knowledge about politics. We therefore conducted additional analyses that separately examined political interest and political knowledge as moderators of the religiositypolitics relations.
Political interest and political knowledge were moderately correlated (r = .39, p < .001).
More importantly, these variables displayed similar patterns as moderators of the associations between religiosity and political characteristics. For all but two of the unique political characteristics assessed, either both interest and knowledge at least near-significantly (at p < .10) moderated the religiosity-politics relation (in the same direction) or neither variable nearsignificantly or significantly moderated this relation. The exceptions were cultural policy preferences, whose relation with religiosity was moderated by political knowledge (b = .09, p < .001) but not political interest (b = .03, p = .504), and ideological identification, whose relation with religiosity was moderated by political knowledge (b = .06, p = .087) but not political interest (b = .02, p = .658). Both political interest (b = .11, p < .001) and political knowledge (b = .11, p < .001) significantly moderated the relation between religiosity and the political orientation composite. All of these moderation effects were in the same direction: high interest and high knowledge were both associated with more of a relation between religiosity and conservative position. Notwithstanding the minor differences, these results indicate that compositizing across political interest and knowledge does not obscure marked differences in the status of these variables as moderators of the religiosity-politics relation.
9 Black Protestants and Black non-Protestants did not significantly differ in the magnitude of the political engagement X religiosity interaction effect (p = .650).
Religiosity, Political Engagement, and Political Conservatism 37 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 . All variables are coded to range from 0 to 1. The following variables were included as controls: year dummies, sex, age, education (college vs. no college), South, household income, household labor union membership, and Hispanic ethnicity. In the analyses conducted with all respondents the dummy coded ethno-religious group variables were also included as controls. 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 . Numbers in the table are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with all variables coded to range from 0 to 1 and the components of the interaction then mean-centered before computation of the interaction term. In the first three rows, religiosity, political engagement, and their interaction were entered simultaneously along with the control variables. In the bottom two rows, simple effects are for hypothetical individuals scoring +1 and -1 SD from the mean on political engagement. The following variables were included as controls: ethno-religious group dummies, year dummies, sex, age, education (college vs. no college), South, household income, household labor union membership, and Hispanic ethnicity. 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 . Numbers in the table are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with all variables coded to range from 0 to 1 and the components of the interaction then mean-centered before computation of the interaction term. In the first three rows, religiosity, political engagement, and their interaction were entered simultaneously along with the control variables. In the bottom two rows, simple effects are for hypothetical individuals scoring +1 and -1 SD from the mean on political engagement. The following variables were included as controls: year dummies, sex, age, education (college vs. no college), South, household income, household labor union membership, and Hispanic ethnicity. 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 . Numbers in the table are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with all variables coded to range from 0 to 1 and the components of the interaction then mean-centered before computation of the interaction term. In the first three rows, religiosity, political engagement, and their interaction were entered simultaneously along with the control variables. In the bottom two rows, simple effects are for hypothetical individuals scoring +1 and -1 SD from the mean on political engagement. The following variables were included as controls: year dummies, sex, age, education (college vs. no college), South, household income, household labor union membership, and Hispanic ethnicity. OLS regression coefficients with all variables coded to range from 0 to 1 and the components of the interaction then mean-centered before computation of the interaction term. In the first three rows, religiosity, political engagement, and their interaction were entered simultaneously along with the control variables. In the bottom two rows, simple effects are for hypothetical individuals scoring +1 and -1 SD from the mean on political engagement. The following variables were included as controls: year dummies, sex, age, education (college vs. no college), South, household income, household labor union membership, and Hispanic ethnicity. OLS regression coefficients with all variables coded to range from 0 to 1 and the components of the interaction then mean-centered before computation of the interaction term. In the first three rows, religiosity, political engagement, and their interaction were entered simultaneously along with the control variables. In the bottom two rows, simple effects are for hypothetical individuals scoring +1 and -1 SD from the mean on political engagement. The following variables were included as controls: year dummies, sex, age, education (college vs. no college), South, household income, household labor union membership, and Hispanic ethnicity. are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with all variables coded to range from 0 to 1 and the components of the interaction then mean-centered before computation of the interaction term. In the first three rows, religiosity, political engagement, and their interaction were entered simultaneously along with the control variables. In the bottom two rows, simple effects are for hypothetical individuals scoring +1 and -1 SD from the mean on political engagement. The following variables were included as controls: year dummies, sex, age, education (college vs. no college), South, household income, household labor union membership, and Hispanic ethnicity. Number of response options (7 vs. 5) varied across respondents depending on mode of interview.
c Only a random half of respondents received this item; the other half was counted as not having provided a usable response
